Research

CCR ORDER 26 Rule 1.5

Where a warrant is issued for the whole or part of the said sum of money and costs, the court officer shall, unless the district judge responsible for execution of the warrant directs otherwise, send a warning notice to the person against whom the warrant is issued and, where such a notice is sent, the warrant shall not be levied until 7 days thereafter.

You can complain about a certificated bailiff by telephoning or writing to:

• the firm the bailiff works for;

• the organisation who employed the bailiff to act on their behalf. Some of these

organisations, for example local authorities have complaints procedures in place and

information on how to complain can be obtained from them;

• the Magistrates’ Court that issued the enforcement order;

• the Enforcement Officers Association, or the Association of Civil Enforcement Agencies

(ACEA) who are responsible for promoting higher standards within the profession.

Information regarding the ACEA complaints procedure can be obtained by writing to:

The Director General

Association of Civil Enforcement Agencies

513 Bradford Road

Batley

West Yorkshire WF17 8LL

Telephone: 01924 350090

e-mail: dir-gen@acea.org.uk

website: www.acea.org.uk

Information regarding the Enforcement Services Associations (ESA) complaints procedure

can be obtained by writing to:

The Executive Director

Enforcement Services Association

Park House

10 Park Street

Bristol BS1 5HX

Telephone: 0870 300 7255

Fax: 0117 915 4521

e-mail: enquiries@ensas.org.uk

website: www.ensas.org.uk

If you wish to complain about a certificated bailiff because you do not think they are fit to

hold a certificate, you need to contact the county court that issued the certificate.

If you are unsure which county court issued the certificate you can contact Her Majesty’s

Courts Service Headquarters on 020 3334 6355. You will need to have the full name of the

certificated bailiff and the company which they work for.

You should set out your complaint on ‘Form 4 - Complaint against a certificated bailiff’

which is available from any county court or from our website

www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk. The form should then be sent to the court manager of the

court where the bailiff’s certificate was issued.

The Family Proceedings Fees Order 2004
11.1 On an application for or in relation to enforcement of a judgment or order of a county court or through a county court, by the issue of a warrant of execution against goods except a warrant to enforce payment of a fine	(a)where the amount for which the warrant issues does not exceed £125.......£30
	(b)where the amount for which the warrant issues exceeds £125.......£50
11.2 On a request for a further attempt at execution of a warrant at a new address following a notice of the reason for non-execution (except a further attempt following suspension)	£20
11.3 On an application to question a judgment debtor or other person on oath in connection with enforcement of a judgment	£40
11.4 On an application for a garnishee order nisi or a charging order nisi, or the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution	£50
Fee 11.4 shall be payable in respect of each party against whom the fee order is sought.
11.5 On an application for a judgment summons	£90
11.6 On the issue of a warrant of possession or a warrant of delivery	£90
Where the recovery of a sum of money is sought in addition, no further fee is payable
11.7 On an application for an attachment of earnings order (other than a consolidated attachment of earnings order) to secure money due under an order made in family proceedings	£60
Fee 11.7 is payable for each defendant against whom an order is sought.
Fee 11.7 is not payable where the attachment of earnings order is made on the hearing of a judgment summons.

No certificate may be granted to any officer of a county court9. Distress for Rent Rules 1988, SI 1988/2050, r 5(3).

If any person not holding a certificate1 levies a distress contrary to the statutory provisions, the person so levying, and any person who has authorised him so to levy, will be deemed to have committed a trespass2

542–686 Wrongful Interference with Goods

For new procedural rules concerning parties in claims for wrongful interference with goods, and the power of the court to order, in certain circumstances, that certain persons be deprived of the right to bring a claim against the defendant, see CPR 19.5A (added by SI 2001/256).

59 What constitutes trespass to goods

note 4—The act of clamping a car is an act of trespass unless it can be shown that the owner has either consented to or willingly assumed the risk of his car being clamped: Vine v Waltham Forest LBC [2000] 4 All ER 169, CA.

Damages may, it seems, be awarded for injury to a trader's reputation caused by an illegal seizure of his goods under a false and pretended claim of right7. The wrongful taking of a chattel may be followed by a wrongful keeping amounting to a conversion8, and where the taking was itself not wrongful, and therefore was not a trespass, the detention may be9. Whether the action is trespass10 or conversion11, the principles12 upon which damages for the wrongful deprivation of chattels are to be assessed are the same13.

A. NON-PECUNIARY LOSS

883. Pain and suffering.

Damages are awarded for the physical and mental distress caused to the plaintiff, both pre-trial and in the future, as a result of the injury1. This includes pain caused by the injury itself2 and any treatment intended to alleviate it; the awareness of and embarrassment at the disability or disfigurement3, or suffering caused by anxiety that the plaintiff's condition may seriously deteriorate4. It may also include cases where the plaintiff is distressed at not being able to perform services for a sick relative5 or at the knowledge that she will leave her young child motherless6. Pain and suffering must be proved and, where the plaintiff has died as a result of his injuries, identified as an element separate from the death itself7. An award under this head depends on the plaintiff's awareness of his suffering: pain and suffering, unlike loss of amenity, is a subjective loss8. Where the plaintiff's life expectancy has been reduced by reason of his injuries, the courts must, in assessing damages for pain and suffering, take into account any suffering caused or likely to be caused to the plaintiff by awareness that his expectation of life has been reduced9.

1 When assessing the damages for pain and suffering, regard will generally be had to the Judicial Studies Board publication Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (3rd Edn, 1996) in order to compensate like with like.2 Kralj v McGrath [1986] 1 All ER 54 (defendant's negligence during delivery of plaintiff's child caused plaintiff excruciating pain). A period of pain and suffering as short as two hours may give rise to a claim under this head: Knight v West Kent Health Authority (1997) 40 BMLR 61, CA.3 Dimmock v Miles (1969, unreported), CA (scarring case).4 Church v Ministry of Defence (1984) 134 NLJ 623 (plaintiff had developed asbestos pleural disease as a result of the defendants' negligence and was awarded £1,500 damages for the anxiety caused by the increased risk that he would develop asbestosis).5 Rourke v Barton (1982) Times, 23 June (plaintiff sustained an injury which prevented her from nursing her husband who was suffering from terminal cancer).6 Jefferson v Cape Insulation (1981) Times, 3 December.7 Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 2 All ER 65, (1992) Times, 9 March, HL, where an action claiming damages for personal injury was brought by the parents of two girls who sustained fatal crushing injuries at the Hillsborough Stadium in 1989; no damages for pain and suffering were awarded since it was not established that any physical injury was caused before the fatal crushing injury.8 Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 QB 638, [1962] 1 All ER 257, CA; H West & Son Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326 at 349, [1963] 2 All ER 625 at 633, HL, per Lord Morris; Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 188, [1979] 2 All ER 910 at 918–919, HL, per Lord Scarman.9 See the Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 1(1)(b); and para 882 note 2 ante.

UPDATE

883 Pain and suffering

note 1—See Reed v Sunderland Health Authority (1998) Times, 16 October, CA.

As to guidelines on the measure of damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity, see Heil v Rankin; Rees v Mabco (102) Ltd (in liquidation); Schofield v Saunders and Taylor Ltd; Ramsay v Rivers; Kent v Griffiths (No 2); Warren v Northern General Hospital NHS Trust; Annable v Southern Derbyshire Health Authority; Connolly v Tasker [2001] QB 272, [2000] 3 All ER 138, CA (modest increase in level of awards required). See also C v A Local Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 302, [2001] 1 FCR 614 (guidelines not appropriate in cases of physical, emotional and sexual abuse).

note 4—As to further guidance on liability in respect of the formation of pleural plaques as a result of negligent exposure to asbestos see Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd, Re Pleural Plaques Litigation [2007] UKHL 39,[2007] 4 All ER 1047, [2007] 3 WLR 876

(B) EXECUTING WRITS AND WARRANTS AGAINST GOODS

1310. Rights of entry in order to levy execution.

The enforcement officer, bailiff or other enforcement agent proceeding to levy an execution against goods1 may legally enter the dwelling house and premises of the judgment debtor2 or of any stranger to whose premises the debtor's property has been removed3, but he must not gain entry by force against the will of the judgment debtor or such stranger4

In order to justify the entering and searching of a stranger's house to seize the goods of the person against whom the process is issued, the enforcement officer or bailiff must prove that the goods to be seized were in fact in the house. He cannot justify by proving that there was reasonable ground of suspicion16.

n the case of an execution against property, the fact that an outer door is illegally broken open does not affect the validity of the subsequent seizure and sale of the property, although it gives a right of action to the person aggrieved19.

DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

The OFT published a guidance note [OFT298] in January 2000 outlining the Director General’s views on misleading letters and collection charges in relation to licensing under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

The OFT reminded creditors and debt collection agencies that the issue of documents
·resembling a court summons or other official document
·leading the debtor to believe they come from or have the authority of a court
·otherwise containing false or misleading information intended to obtain payment

- may be criminal offences under the County Courts Act 1984and/or the Administration of Justice Act 1970.



Any practice liable or intended to mislead the debtor – whether as to the origin or authority of any document or as to any other material matter is likely to be regarded as deceitful or oppressive or otherwise unfair or improper within the meaning of section 25(2)(d) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, whether the practice is unlawful or not.



It is an offence under Section 135/136 of the County Courts Act1984 to deliver or cause to be delivered to any person any document
·which, by reason of its form or contents has the false appearance of having been issued under the authority of a county court
·falsely purporting to be a copy of any summons or other process of a county court, knowing it to be false, or to act or profess to act under any pretence of the process or authority of a county court



It is an offence under Section 40(1)(c)/(d) of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 to falsely present
·a document as having some official character which it has not with the object of coercing another person to pay money claimed as a debt due under a contract
·an individual to be authorised in some official capacity to claim or enforce payment



It is an offence under Section 40 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 and Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988
·to harass of debtors with a view to obtaining payment including the issue of letters which convey a threat or false information with intent to cause distress or anxiety.



Documents may be in breach of the County Courts Act and/or the Administration of Justice Act even if they do not exactly resemble a court summons or other official document.

Documents may not
·by reason of their form or contents or both, appear to have been issued by or under the authority of a court or other official body.
·mislead as to the nature of the processes involved or the likelihood of legal proceedings.

All statements contained in letters and other documents to consumers must be capable of being substantiated in the event of a complaint.

Debt Collection Charges

There is no legal basis for a creditor or a debt collection agency acting on its behalf to claim collection costs from a debtor unless there is an express provision in the original agreement.

Without such provision, collection charges cannot be demanded as a debt due under the agreement.

If an agency claims the right to recover charges under a separate agreement with the debtor, there must be a binding contact to this effect, with legal consideration (ie benefit) provided to the debtor.

A letter advising the debtor of a liability for certain charges is not such an agreement, regardless of whether it is signed by the debtor.



If an indication of charges payable on default is not included in a credit agreement regulated under The Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983, it is not properly executed and will not be enforceable against the debtor without a court order.



It is likely to be an ‘unfair or improper business practice’ underSection 25(2)(d) of the Consumer Credit Act if
·Creditors or collection agencies fail to ensure that they do NOT recover collection charges in the absence of an express contractual provision entitling them to do so
·Debtors are led or allowed to believe that they are legally liable to pay such charges where this is not the case.
·Any ambiguity in the debtor-creditor agreement as to whether it covers a particular charge, or the permitted amount of the charge is not resolved in favour of the debtor
·collection charges provided for in the credit agreement are levied at an unreasonable amount and/or are disproportionate to the main debt



All these issues will be relevant to questions of fitness to hold a licence under the Consumer Credit Act, whether or not they result in prosecution of the individual(s) or company(ies) concerned.

Under section 25(2) of the Consumer Credit Act the fitness of a licensee can be brought into question by the actions of any of its employees, agents or associates, and section 25(3) defines ‘associate’ for these purposes as including a business associate.



This document has been summarised by the national association of bank + insurance customers (nabic) from the document issued by OFT. More copies of this document are available fromwww.LemonAid.net the original document is available fromwww.oft.gov.uk


Page last changed 29 April, 2003

The Distress for Rent Rules 1988

1. For levying distress—

(i)where the sum demanded and due does not exceed £100	£12.50
(ii)where the sum demanded and due exceeds £100	12½% on the first £100, 4% on the next £400, 2½% on the next £1,500, 1% on the next £8,000 and ¼% on any additional sum.

2. For attending to levy distress where the levy is not made, the reasonable costs and charges for attending to levy, not exceeding the fees which would have been due under paragraph 1 if the distress had been levied; the costs and charges are subject to taxation under rule 11.

3. For taking possession—

(i)where a man is left in physical possession, £4.50 per day

(ii)where walking possession is taken, 45p per day

Note: The charge for walking possession is payable only if a walking possession agreement in Form 8 has been concluded.

A man left in possession must provide his own board in every case.

The possession fee is payable in respect of the day on which the distress is levied, but a fee for physical possession must not be charged where a walking possession agreement is signed at the time when the distress is levied.

4. For appraisement, at the request in writing of the tenant, the reasonable fees, charges and expenses of the broker, subject to taxation under rule 11.

5. For attending to remove, the reasonable costs and charges attending the removal; the costs and charges are subject to taxation under rule 11.

6. For sale—

(i)where the sale is held on the auctioneer’s premises, for commission to the auctioneer, an inclusive charge to include all out-of-pocket expenses of 15% on the sum realised, and the reasonable cost of advertising, removal and storage.

(ii)where the sale is held on the debtor’s premises, for commission to the auctioneer, in addition to out-of-pocket expenses actually and reasonably incurred, 7½% on the sum realised.

7. Reasonable fees, charges and expenses where distress is withdrawn or where no sale takes place, and for negotiations between landlord and tenant respecting the distress, subject to taxation under rule 11.

8. For the purpose of calculating any percentage charges a fraction of £1 is to be reckoned as £1 but any fraction of a penny in the total amount of the fee so calculated is to be disregarded.

9. In addition to any amount authorised by this Table in respect of the supply of goods or services on which value added tax is chargeable there may be added a sum equivalent to value added tax at the appropriate rate on that amount.

trespass is used most commonly to describe the intentional and wrongful invasion of another's real property. An action for trespass can be maintained by the owner or anyone else who has a lawful right to occupy the real property, such as the owner of an apartment building, a tenant, or a member of the tenant's family. The action can be maintained against anyone who interferes with the right of ownership or possession, whether the invasion is by a person or by something that a person has set in motion. For example, a hunter who enters fields where hunting is forbidden is a trespasser, and so is a company that throws rocks onto neighboring land when it is blasting.

Every unlawful entry onto another's property is trespass, even if no harm is done to the property. A person who has a right to come onto the land may become a trespasser by committing wrongful acts after entry. For example, a mail carrier has a privilege to walk up the sidewalk at a private home but is not entitled to go through the front door. A person who enters property with permission but stays after he has been told to leave also commits a trespass. Moreover, an intruder cannot defend himself in a trespass action by showing that the plaintiff did not have a completely valid legal right to the property. The reason for all of these rules is that the action of trespass exists to prevent breaches of the peace by protecting the quiet possession of real property.

All England Law Reports/1968/Volume 1 /Vaughan v Mckenzie - [1968] 1 All ER 1154

[1968] 1 All ER 1154

Vaughan v Mckenzie

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

LORD PARKER CJ, WINN LJ AND ASHWORTH J

19, 21 FEBRUARY 1968

County Court - Execution - Bailiff - Entry - Use of force - Respondent, knowing bailiff had come to levy

execution, entered her house and tried to shut the door against the bailiff - Bailiff pushed door open to obtain

entry - Respondent assaulted him - Whether an assault on the bailiff in the execution of his duty - County

Courts Act, 1959(7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 22), s 30.

On 5 May 1967, a warrant of execution against the goods of the respondent was issued by Leeds county

court. The appellant, a bailiff of that court, went with another bailiff to the respondent's house on May 22. The

house was closed, but the respondent returned to it later and, when outside her front door, was told the

reason for the appellant's visit; but the warrant was not shown or read to her. The respondent entered the

house and immediately attempted to shut the door, but the other bailiff put his foot in the door and pushed.

The appellant assisted the other bailiff and they forced open the door with the object of gaining entry to the

house, whereupon the respondent struck the appellant on the head with a milk bottle. On appeal from the

dismissal of a charge against the respondent of having assaulted the appellant in the execution of his duty,

contrary to s 30 of the County Courts Act, 1959.

Held - The bailiffs had no right to force their way into the respondent's house for the purpose of gaining entry

to enforce their warrant of execution, and in so doing they were not acting in execution of their duty;

accordingly the information had been rightly dismissed (see p 1156, letter h, and p 1156, letter i, to p 1157,

letter a, post).

Broughton v Wilkerson ((1880), 44 JP 781) and Rossiter v Conway ((1893), 58 JP 350) followed.

Per Curiam: the mere fact the warrant was neither shown nor read to the respondent did not have the

consequence that the bailiffs were not acting in the execution of their duty, since the respondent knew the

purpose for which they had come (see p 1155, letter i, post).

Appeal dismissed.

Notes

As to the right of entry in execution of civil process, see 16 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edn) 41, 42, paras 61, 62;

and for cases on the subject, see 21 Digest (Repl) 567, 568, 615-640.

As to the offence of assault on officers or county courts, see 9 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edn) 133 para 260; and

for cases on the subject, see 13 Digest (Repl) 377, 66-71.

Page 2

For the County Courts Act, 1959, s 30, see 39 Halsbury's Statutes (2nd Edn) 122.

Cases referred to in judgments

Broughton v Wilkerson (1880), 44 JP 781, 21 Digest (Repl) 567, 623.

Nash v Lucas (1867), LR 2 QB 590, 32 JP 23, 18 Digest (Repl) 324, 698.

Rossiter v Conway (1893), 58 JP 350, 46 Digest (Repl) 420, 640.

Southam v Smout [1963] 3 All ER 104, [1964] 1 QB 308, [1963] 3 WLR 606, Digest (Cont Vol A) 317,

57a.

Case Stated

On 26 May 1967, at a court of summary jurisdiction sitting at Leeds, the appellant preferred an

information before John Randolph, Esq, stipendiary magistrate for the City of Leeds against the

respondent for that she did assault the appellant, an officer of the Leeds county court, while in the

execution of his duty as such officer contrary to s 30 of the County Courts Act, 1959. The facts

found are summarised in the judgment of Lord Parker CJ. It was

[1968] 1 All ER 1154 at 1155

contended by the respondent before the magistrate (a) that the appellant and another bailiff who

was with him were trespassers and that she had used no more force than was reasonably

necessary to evict them; (b) that as the warrant had not been shown or read to her the appellant

was not acting in execution of his duty.

The stipendiary magistrate was of the opinion (a) that the appellant and the other bailiff were not

justified in law for the purpose of gaining entry to execute a civil warrant in attempting to push open

a door which the respondent was endeavouring to shut and that they were accordingly trespassers;

(b) that, in any event the appellant and the other bailiff, not having shown or read the warrant to the

respondent, were not acting in execution of their duty. The question for the opinion of the High

Court was whether, on the above facts, the stipendiary magistrate came to a correct conclusion in

point of law.

Nigel Bridge for the appellant.

The respondent did not appear and was not represented.

21 February 1968. The following judgments were delivered.

LORD PARKER CJ

having stated the nature of the appeal, continued. On 5 May 1967, a warrant of execution against the goods

of the respondent was issued by the Leeds county court for some £91 in respect of costs. The appellant, who

is a bailiff of the Leeds county court, went with another bailiff on 22 May to the house where the respondent

lived. When they got there, the house was closed, the respondent being away. The bailiffs waited, and later

the respondent returned with her child. Outside the front door, the appellant and the other bailiff told the

respondent that they were bailiffs, and had come to levy execution on her goods. It is true that no warrant

Page 3

was produced to her, but it is quite clear that she knew full well who they were, and what they had come

about, because she immediately told them that she had written to the county court and the Lord Chancellor

regarding these costs, and she said that she would not admit them to the house.

What happened then, was that she and the child entered the house and immediately attempted to shut the

door, but the other bailiff, Mr Richmond, got his foot in the door and pushed against it, the respondent on her

side pushing to keep him out. The appellant came to the assistance of Mr Richmond, and both of them

forced the door open with the object of gaining entry to the house, whereupon the respondent finding a milk

bottle handy, picked it up and struck the appellant on the head with the bottle of milk, whereby he sustained

a one inch long cut requiring three stitches. Those are the short facts of this case. The magistrate stated his

opinion in this form:

"(a) That the appellant and Richmond were not justified in law for the purpose of gaining entry to execute a civil

warrant, in attempting to push open the door which the respondent was endeavouring to close against them and that

they were accordingly trespassers; (b) that, in any event, the appellant and Richmond, not having shown or read the

warrant to the respondent, were not acting in the execution of their duty."

So far as that latter reason is concerned, I am quite satisfied that the magistrate was wrong. This was a case

where she plainly knew that they were bailiffs, and plainly knew the object with which they had come, and the

fact that the warrant was not produced was not, in the circumstances, fatal to these proceedings.

The real question here is whether the bailiffs were justified in attempting to push open the door by force

against the will of the respondent. I confess that in the course of the argument my own feeling was that the

magistrate had come to a right conclusion, and it is to be observed that in Southam v Smout, which was

dealing with the mode of entry which is lawful there is a passage in

[1968] 1 All ER 1154 at 1156

the judgment of Lord Denning MR where, after referring to Nash v Lucas he said ([1963] 3 All ER at p 108;

[1964] 1 QB at p 322):

"SIR ALEXANDER COCKBURN, C.J., said [(1867), LR 2 QB at p 594] that the later authorities say you may open a

door which is only fastened by a latch. He thought that was going a very long way, further than the American courts

had done, but the authorities were limited to the case where the door is shut but can be opened without violence."

I find it difficult to see what the real difference is, for present purposes, between a door which is momentarily

opened but which is sought to be closed and can only be opened fully by violence, and a door which is shut

and which can only be opened by violence.

However, in the course of the proceedings Winn LJ with his usual industry, found the case of Broughton v

Wilkerson. The facts of that case were almost identical with the present; there the bailiff went to the

respondent's house, he knocked at the outer front door, which was locked; the respondent came to the door,

opened it and held it until they had an altercation; the appellant then took hold of the door, put his foot

between it and the doorpost and shoved his shoulder against it to obtain entry; he did not produce the

warrant or tell the respondent what his business was, but the respondent knew him well and said: "You, you

shan't come in" and shoved him out. Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ said ((1880), 44 JP at p 481):

"The justices seem to give a wrong reason for their decision, but the decision was right. The officer had no right to force

his way into the respondent's house, which was the respondent's castle. Whether the officer was known or not this was

illegal, and therefore he was not in the execution of his duty at all when he was assaulted. He seems to have provoked

the assault. I think as he was clearly not in the execution of his duty, our judgment must be for the respondent."

Page 4

Lush J said ((1880), 44 JP at p 481):

"Every man's house is his castle. That has been settled long ago, and a bailiff cannot force his way inside to lay

execution for a debt. It is impossible to read this case and say that the bailiff was in execution of his duty."

Further industry, this time on the part of counsel for the appellant, has found that that case has been

approved in Rossiter v Conway. That case differed in certain immaterial respects; it was a constable

executing a warrant of distress; that does not affect the matter, and instead of a foot between the door and

the door post it was an arm. The court in that case held that the constable was not acting in the execution of

his duty, and relied on and approved the earlier case of Broughton v Wilkerson. Both those cases are binding

on this court, and I have no doubt in those circumstances that this appeal must be dismissed.

WINN LJ.

I agree. The essential criterion in any such situation as there was in the present case is whether the

householder has left a means of entrance available for the bailiff without the employment of any degree of

force. As Lord Parker CJ has said, this is a case where a foot was interposed between the door post and the

door itself. In the other two cases arms were

[1968] 1 All ER 1154 at 1157

thrust in, but it is perfectly clear that whilst in those cases some force was used, in neither of them was

entrance being sought vi et armis.

ASHWORTH J.

I agree.

Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords granted, the court certifying under s 1 of the

Administration of Justice Act, 1960, that a point of law of general public importance was involved, viz,

whether an officer executing civil process may lawfully enter the dwellinghouse of the execution debtor

through an unfastened door if the execution debtor knowing the officer's business physically resists his entry.

Solicitors: Treasury Solicitor for the appellant.

Patricia Johnston Barrister.

125 Irregularity in executing warrants

(1) No officer of a county court in executing any warrant of a court, and no person at whose instance any such warrant is executed, shall be deemed a trespasser by reason of any irregularity or informality—

(a) in any proceeding on the validity of which the warrant depends; or

(b) in the form of the warrant or in the mode of executing it;

but[, except in the case of a warrant of control (to which Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 applies),] any person aggrieved may bring an action for any special damage sustained by him by reason of the irregularity or informality against the person guilty of it.

(2) No costs shall be recovered in such an action unless the damages awarded exceed £2.

Magistrates Courts Act 1980 Schedule 4Use of force

5

An authorised officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of a power conferred on him by this Schedule.]

(note by cheesebiscuit --However this does not include a warrant of EXECution, Also the question remains as to what is reasonable, I would rely on the previously cited case law regarding foot in door)